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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samuel J. Davis appeals from his judgment of conviction for entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to robbery. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress because a custodial interrogation proceeded after he asserted his
right to counsel, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and because
his confession was not voluntary.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Davis was identified as a suspect in a robbery at a “Check n’ Go in Post Fall,
Idaho and a warrant was issued for his arrest. (R., p.84.) He was arrested pursuant to
this warrant in Missouri and was interrogated by Post Falls Detectives Uhrig and
McLean in Missouri. (R, p.85.) During this interrogation, Mr. Davis made incriminating
statements with regard to the robbery. (R., p.85.)
Mr. Davis was charged with one count of robbery and one count of burglary.
(R., p.49.) He filed a motion to suppress the statements made to the detectives during
the interrogation, asserting that questioning continued after he asserted his right to
counsel, and that his confession was not voluntary. (R., pp.55, 67.) At the hearing, a
recording to the interview, as well as a transcript of the interview, were admitted into
evidence. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 (transcript of the interview) and 2 (recording of the
interview).)1 Detective Uhrig testified as well.
At the outset of the interview, Detective Uhrig informed Mr. Davis of his rights,
stating, “[y]ou have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used
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against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him
present with you while you’re being questioned. If you can’t afford to hire a lawyer, one
will be appointed to represent you before questioning, if you wish one.” (Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1, p.2, Ls.15-21.) Mr. Davis stated that he understood and was willing to speak.
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.2, Ls.22-23; p.3, Ls.2-5.)
The detectives began interrogating Mr. Davis, who soon said, “I think I need to
talk to a lawyer before I say anything else. I mean, I want to help you guys out, but I’m
– I got so much on the line. I’m in the Air Force reserves, I got my job at Fed Ex, I got
my kid.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.5, Ls.16-20.) Detective McLean responded, stating,
“[h]ere’s how it goes. We have enough evidence to prove that you did this. You are
going to be under arrest for the robbery, you are going to be extradited back to Idaho,
so you might as well come clean so when you do this, we can say, look, he was honest,
he came forward.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.6, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Davis was then informed that
the detectives that “while we’re here, we’re going to be doing a search warrant on your
house, we’re doing a search warrant on your car, so you’d help yourself out and take
responsibility for what you did, and that looks a lot better than us going and tearing your
house apart and trying to find anything that was associated with the robbery you had.”
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.6 L.21 – p.7 L.3.)
The detectives then set out more evidence they claimed to have, and Mr. Davis
stated, “what kind of a deal can you give me?” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.18-19.)
Detective McLean stated that he could not make deals, only the prosecutor could.
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.20-21.) Mr. Davis then said that he could not afford to be
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For ease of reference, Mr. Davis will cite to the transcript of the interview in this brief.
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extradited back to Idaho. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.22-23.) When he was told he
need to “do the right thing,” Mr. Davis stated, “I know, but if I give you my side of the
story, can you get with the prosecutor to work out a deal where I don’t get expedited
(sic) back?” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.9, Ls.1-3.) Detective Uhrig stated that, “[w]hat I can
promise you is that I will tell the prosecutor your side of the story. I’m not authorized to
make any sort of deal.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.9, Ls.4-7.)
The detectives then agreed to call the prosecutor, and then Detective McLean
asked, “before you do this [speak further], you want to talk to us; right?” (Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1, p.9, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Davis stated, “yeah,” and then “I mean, that’s the only way
I got. I mean, I can’t afford a lawyer. If I get expedited (sic), I’m losing everything and
then some. I’ll never be able to recover.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.10, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Davis
then explained his involvement in the robbery.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.84.) Specifically, the
district court ruled that Mr. Davis did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel and
that his confession was voluntary. (R., pp.91-93.) Mr. Davis entered into a conditional
guilty plea in which he preserved the right to appeal from the motion to suppress.
(R., pp.95, 96.) The State dismissed the burglary charge. (R., p.98.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and the court suspended
the sentence and placed Mr. Davis on probation. (R., p.110.) Mr. Davis appealed.
(R., p.118.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Davis’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Davis asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

because he invoked his right to counsel and because his confession was not voluntary.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact
which were supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561
(Ct. App. 1996).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis’s Motion To Suppress
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a

defendant has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST AMEND
V. A defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights must be explained to him before custodial
interrogation may begin.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

According to

Miranda:
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the

5

presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 464. Miranda safeguards must “come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v.
Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Interrogation is defined as “any words or actions on
the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. Once a defendant unambiguously
invokes his right to remain silent or his right to counsel all questioning must cease.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445. In his motion to suppress, Mr. Davis asserted both that
he unequivocally requested counsel and that his confession was involuntary.
(R., pp.55-61.) The district court addressed the two claims. (R, pp.91-93.) On appeal,
Mr. Davis asserts that the district court erred.

1.

Request For Counsel

The United States Supreme Court has held that once a person in custody has
“expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [the suspect] is not
subject to further interrogation until counsel has been available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.”

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981).

Once a suspect has

clearly articulated a request for counsel, that suspect shall not be subjected to further
questioning on that offense. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267, 47 P.3d 763, 770
(Ct. App. 2002). “Any responses to further interrogation are admissible only when it is
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused initiated further
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discussions and he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel which he had
earlier invoked.” Id. (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)).
Invocation of the right to counsel requires, “at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of
counsel.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991). A request for counsel is
judged under an objective standard and the request must be clear and unequivocal and
may not be ambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994); State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 31, 36 (2001).
In this case, the district court held that any request for counsel was equivocal.
(R., p.91.) After Mr. Davis was advised of his Miranda rights, he stated, “I think I need
to talk to a lawyer before I say anything else. I mean, I want to help you guys out, but
I’m – I got so much on the line. I’m in the Air Force reserves, I got my job at Fed Ex, I
got my kid.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.5, Ls.16-20.)
Mr. Davis acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the phrase,
“I think,” is equivocal. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 559 (2008). In Payne, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s statement, “I don't think I should answer that,”
was not sufficiently clear such that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
understand it as an invocation of the right to remain silent. Id. This Court concluded,
“[t]he phrase, ‘I think,’ like the phrase ‘maybe I should’ is equivocal.” Id. (citing Clark v.
Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.2003)).

Mr. Davis acknowledges that he

prefaced his statement with, “I think.” Mindful of this fact, he asserts that the phrase, “I
think I need to talk to a lawyer before I say anything else,” is sufficiently clear that a
reasonable officer in the circumstance would understand it as an invocation of the right
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to counsel.

As such, Mr. Davis asserts that the district court erred in finding his

statement to be equivocal.

2.

Voluntariness Of The Confession

In reviewing a claim of an involuntary confession obtained due to police coercion,
the court looks to the totality of the circumstances and whether the “defendant’s will was
overborne by the police conduct.” State v. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 953 (Ct. App. 2013).
In determining the voluntariness of a confession, a court must look to the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation, including: (1) whether Miranda
warnings were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused’s level of education
or low intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or sleep. Stone, 154 Idaho at 953;
see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Other considerations
may include whether deception, trickery, threats, or direct or implied promises were
utilized. State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 485 (Ct. App. 2015); see also Stone, 154 Idaho
at 953, 303 P.3d at 640. It is the burden of the State to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant’s confession or other statements were voluntarily given.
Stone, 154 Idaho at 953, 303 P.3d at 640.
In his motion to suppress, Mr. Davis asserted that, while he was read Miranda
warnings, he did not sign a waiver, and his statement that, “I mean, that’s the only way I
got. I mean, I can’t afford a lawyer. If I get expedited (sic), I’m losing everything and
then some. I’ll never be able to recover,” showed that he did not fully understand that
he could have a lawyer appointed. (R., p.58.) He also asserted that the detectives
“took advantage of the fact that [Mr. Davis] hoped to remain in Missouri rather than
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being immediately extradited back to Idaho.” (R., p.60.) He submitted that, “the officers
clearly suggested that the only way he could avoid extradition to Idaho was by doing the
right thing and confessing to the robbery.” (R., p.60.)
In denying the motion to suppress, the district court held that there was no
evidence that Mr. Davis’s statements regarding the inability to pay for private counsel
demonstrated any inability to under the Miranda warnings. (R., p.90.) Further, the court
held that there was no evidence that the detectives informed Mr. Davis that he could
avoid extradition to Idaho by confessing, and there was no evidence that Mr. Davis was
deprived of food, water, or sleep or that the interrogation lasted an inordinate amount of
time. (R., p.92.)
Mr. Davis acknowledges that there is no evidence that he was deprived of food,
water, or sleep, or that he was subject to an inordinately long interrogation, but he
submits that it is clear from the transcript that he was primarily concerned about being
extradited back to Idaho. In this case, after the detectives set out the evidence they
claimed to have, Mr. Davis stated, “what kind of a deal can you give me?” (Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.18-19.) Detective McLean stated that he could not make deals, only
the prosecutor could. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.20-21.) Mr. Davis then said that he
could not afford to be expedited (sic) back to Idaho. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.7, Ls.22-23.)
When he was told he need to “do the right thing,” Mr. Davis stated, “I know, but if I give
you my side of the story, can you get with the prosecutor to work out a deal where I
don’t get expedited (sic) back?”

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.9, Ls.1-3.)

Detective Uhrig

stated that, “[w]hat I can promise you is that I will tell the prosecutor your side of the
story. I’m not authorized to make any sort of deal.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, p.9, Ls.4-7.)
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Mr. Davis acknowledges that the detectives never stated that they could offer him
a deal in which he could avoid extradition. However, he asserts that it is clear that he
only spoke to the officers once they promised to speak to the prosecutor in the case,
and it is clear that Mr. Davis wanted them to speak to the prosecutor about avoiding
extradition.

Further, he asserts that his statement, “I can’t afford a lawyer,” does

evidence that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights. Any waiver of Miranda
rights must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Alger, 115 Idaho
42, 45 (Ct. App. 1988).
While Mr. Davis was read Miranda warnings and stated that he understood, his
statement that he could not afford a lawyer suggests that he did not fully understand
that a lawyer could be appointed free of charge. The Miranda warning that was read to
Mr. Davis stated that if he could not hire a lawyer, one would be appointed, but it did not
state he would not have to pay for that lawyer. (Defendant’s Exhibit A.)
Mr. Davis submits that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that he only
confessed in order to avoid extradition, which is why he wanted the detectives to call the
prosecutor. Further, he asserts that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights.
Under these circumstances, he asserts that the district court erred by concluding that
his confession was voluntary.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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